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Abstract
We define an evolutionary process of “economic Darwinism” for playing-
the-field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is “eco-
nomic selection”: if current behavior leads to payoﬀ diﬀerences, behavior
yielding lowest payoﬀ has strictly positive probability of being replaced by
an arbitrary behavior. The other is “mutation”: any behavior has at any
point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbi-
trary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance
with “evolutionary equilibrium”, a static equilibrium concept suggested in
the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under posi-
tive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under-
(over-) activity than does Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classification: C72
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Darwinian evolution, economic selection,
mutation, evolutionary equilibrium, stochastic stability.
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1 Introduction
An interesting view in economics asserts that the foundations for behavioral princi-
ples such as profit maximization or behavior in accordance with Nash equilibrium
should be found in evolutionary selection against those who do not behave in ac-
cordance with these principles. Such a view was, e.g., underlying the defense of the
assumption of profit maximization by Alchian (1950), Enke (1951) and Friedman
(1953). Informally the idea is that economic agents, e.g. owners and managers of
firms, in their behavior are guided by simple rules of thumb and markets select
against behavior that leads to relatively low payoﬀs. This happens, for instance, by
capital seeking to the more profitable firms. Hence, badly performing behavior will
disappear and remaining behavior will perform well vis-a-vis other remaining behav-
ior in accordance with profit maximization and Nash equilibrium. The economist
can therefore safely analyze as if active individuals obey these principles although
no one does so consciously.
This paper studies an evolutionary process intended to formalize the above idea
in the context of strategic interactions (games) and investigates what kind of behav-
ior it supports. The situation we have in mind is that a symmetric game is played
recurrently by individuals, and in each round the game is played “all against all”,
such that participating individuals are “playing the field” as opposed to a situation
with “pair-wise contests”. Any participant is locked at a fixed strategy, its rule of
thumb, except for random shifts. We intend to identify the behavioral implications
of two forces: economic selection and mutation.
Economic selection should capture the elimination of the unfit: if current behav-
ior implies payoﬀ diﬀerences between individuals, then (individuals with) behavior
yielding relatively low payoﬀs have positive probability of being displaced by (incom-
ing individuals with) an arbitrary behavior. Displaced behavior is not necessarily
replaced by a more successful behavior that already occurs, but by an arbitrary
possible behavior. This means that the kind of selection we have in mind is not
appropriately mimicked by imitation. In a biological context it may be natural to
assume that badly performing, displaced individuals are replaced by the oﬀspring of
more successful individuals, and the oﬀspring inherits the more successful behavior
of its parents, so that the resulting evolutionary selection is as if more successful
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behavior is imitated. In an economic context the idea of inherited behavior is not
as natural. For instance, a fired manager is not replaced by a clone of another and
more successful manager, but rather by a new candidate with own “fresh” ideas.
Hence, if one wants to study the mere implications of elimination of the unfit in
an economic context, a process of imitation will not generally be an appropriate
metaphor. It is to distinguish the kind of Darwinian selection studied here from
a biological one that we refer to it as “economic”. The fact that the evolutionary
process we study is not one of imitation, is a main novel feature of this paper.
The second force, mutation, should capture that economic agents experiment
with alternative behavior: for any individual there is in any round of play a small
positive probability that current behavior is replaced by an arbitrary behavior.
By economic Darwinismwe understand the combined force of economic selection
and mutation.
To be more specific we formulate an explicit dynamic process as follows. In
each round of play the actions of the individuals participating in the play of a
symmetric, n-player game are listed in the current “state”. A basic dynamic process,
a Markov chain on the state space, captures economic selection: if the current
state implies payoﬀ diﬀerences, actions giving maximal payoﬀ are not changed,
while for actions yielding lowest payoﬀ, and possibly for other actions yielding less
than maximal payoﬀ, there is positive probability that the actions are replaced
by arbitrary actions. A perturbed process captures economic selection as well as
rare mutation: in addition to the transitions between states as governed by the
basic process, every individual has in any round a small independent probability of
switching to an arbitrary behavior. As the probability of mutation becomes very
small, only particular states will be observed frequently. These are the so-called
stochastically stable states and the particular patterns of behavior associated with
these are the patterns supported by economic Darwinism.
To characterize these patterns of behavior we make use of a static solution con-
cept originally suggested by Schaﬀer (1989) and further studied by Possajennikov
(2003) and Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2002). Let “wide spread” behavior be repre-
sented by a common strategy used by everybody, so that everybody obtains the
same payoﬀ and the situation therefore is stable with respect to economic as well as
biological selection. For such wide spread behavior to be stable also with respect to
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mutation there should be no alternative strategy such that a single player deviating
to this strategy obtains strictly larger payoﬀ than the non-deviating players, since
a mutation to such a strategy would be successful and displace existing behavior.
Following Schaﬀer and Possajennikov we refer to a strategy fulfilling this criterion
as a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium.1 It is well-known that such an equilibrium
is equivalent to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a modified game where payoﬀs are
defined relatively, such that a player’s payoﬀ in the modified game is the excess of
his payoﬀ from the original game over the lowest payoﬀ of a player.
Our first main result is that for a large class of games, any stochastically stable
state involves behavior is as in a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium (given such
an equilibrium exists). As a corollary, if there is a unique symmetric evolution-
ary equilibrium, the two solution concepts coincide. These results are useful for
applications because evolutionary equilibrium is relatively tractable.
One implication is that economic Darwinism does not generally support Nash
equilibrium since Nash equilibria in relative payoﬀs only accidently coincide with
the original Nash equilibria. Hence, the view described in the first paragraph is not
generally supported by our formal results.
We use the equivalence between stochastically stable states and evolutionary
equilibrium when the latter is unique to prove our second main result: in typical
economic situations where externalities are either overall positive or overall negative,
the outcomes of economic Darwinism are even worse than Nash equilibrium out-
comes with respect to eﬃciency, as they involve even more under- or over-activity.
The contributions of the literature most closely related to this paper study evo-
lutionary processes of imitation and mutation. Originally Vega-Redondo (1997)
suggested such a process and studied it in symmetric, n-player Cournot oligopoly
games. Vega-Redondo’s process can be viewed either as one of conscious imita-
tion or as a metaphor for evolutionary (biological) selection. Vega-Redondo found
that behavior in the unique stochastically stable state according to his process of
imitation and mutation corresponds exactly to the competitive or price-taking, Wal-
1Schaﬀer (1989) studies the implications of symmetric evolutionary equilibrium in Cournot
duopoly games and finds equivalence with competitive (price taking) equilibrium. Possajennikov
(2003) and Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2002) study more general games and establish equivalence
results between (symmetric) evolutionary equilibrium and so-called aggregate-taking equilibrium,
see Section 2 below.
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rasian outcome. The results of Vega-Redondo have been generalized and extended
by Schenk-Hoppé (2000), who also studies a process of imitation and mutation in
Cournot oligopoly. Furthermore, Schipper (2003) and Stegeman and Rhode (2004)
study processes of imitation and mutation in more general settings.2
According to these imitative processes, there is in each round for each individual
positive probability that the current strategy is revised into the strategy of another
individual who earns at least as much payoﬀ. Since, whenever a type of behavior is
revised, it is changed into a behavior that is already being used, the set of behaviors
can only shrink (except for mutation). According to economic selection relatively
poorly performing behavior is replaced by arbitrary behavior, so that the set of
strategies used can increase even without mutation. Thus, our process of economic
Darwinism is diﬀerent from imitation and mutation, also in a mathematical sense.
As a consequence, the proofs of the basic equivalence theorems as well as their un-
derlying assumptions are essentially diﬀerent between the contributions mentioned
and this one: economic selection allows more generality than imitation, as will be
explained in detail in Section 4 below.
Section 2 defines symmetric games and evolutionary as well as other static equi-
librium concepts, and states some well-known equivalence results. Section 3 defines
the dynamic process of economic Darwinism and stochastic stability with respect to
it. In Section 4 we state our result on the relation between evolutionary equilibrium
and stochastic stability with respect to economic Darwinism, and explain how our
theorem and its proof diﬀer from similar theorems and proofs for processes based
on imitation. In Section 5 we use our characterization to identify the outcomes of
economic Darwinism in some games of economic interest, and Section 6 states our
result on the general eﬃciency implications of economic Darwinism. Section 7 oﬀers
some concluding remarks.
2Stegeman and Rhode formulate very explicitly the idea that imitation can (should) be seen
as capturing Darwinian selection: “Our strategy selection process is imitative, but it is useful to
view imitation dynamics as a special case of Darwinian dynamics: in a finite population of fixed
size, Darwinian selection requires that individuals playing poorly-performing strategies switch to
strategies that are performing better”. As we have argued above, this may be a natural view for
biological selection, but less natural in an economic context.
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2 Symmetric games and evolutionary equilibrium
We consider a game with a fixed set of players, N = {1, ..., n}. The non-empty
strategy set of each player i is S ⊆ R. The set of strategy profiles is Ω ≡ Sn.
A profile (element in Ω) will be denoted by ω or (s1, ..., sn) or (si, s−i). Payoﬀ
functions are ui : Ω→ R, i = 1, ..., n.
We focus on symmetric games and assume that the payoﬀ obtained by player i,
when player i uses strategy si and the other players use a constellation of strategies
s−i, depends in the same way on si and s−i independently of i, and is the same
independently of how the strategies of s−i are distributed among the players diﬀerent
from i:
Assumption 1. There is a common payoﬀ function u : Ω → R, such that
ui(s1, ..., si, ..., sn) = u(si, s−i) for i = 1, ..., n, and u has the property that u(si, s−i) =
u(si, s0−i) for any permutation s
0
−i of the strategies in s−i.
Assumption 1 implies that whenever two players take the same action they
receive the same payoﬀ.
Contributions such as Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2002), Possajennikov (2003), Schip-
per (2003), and Leininger (2004) assume that there is a common utility function,
v : R2 → R, and an aggregator function, A : Ω → R, such that ui(si, s−i) =
v(si, A(si, s−i)) for all players i, and A fulfils A(ω) = A(ω0) for all permutations ω0
of ω. When the payoﬀ functions have this special structure we say that the game
has "the aggregator property".3 The aggregator property implies Assumption 1
and is featured by many economic examples, but Assumption 1 allows for more (see
Section 5 below).
The static concept of evolutionary equilibrium formulated by Schaﬀer (1989) and
meant to capture the elimination of the least fit when mutations occur is motivated
as follows. A first requirement for evolutionary stability is that all players obtain the
same payoﬀ, since if there were payoﬀ diﬀerences a behavior yielding lowest payoﬀ
would tend to die out. Since the aim is to establish support for certain types of
“common, widespread behavior”, the focus is on symmetric strategy profiles where
all players take the same action and thus automatically obtain the same payoﬀ.
3A game has the aggregator property in our terminology if it is an aggregative game in the
sense of Corchón (1994) and is symmetric in the sense of Assumption 1.
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Second, there should be stability with respect to mutations, such that if a single
player mutates to a new behavior, then this behavior will be displaced because
it obtains least payoﬀ in the constellation of behavior after the mutation. These
considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 1 A strategy profile (s∗1, ..., s
∗
n) ∈ Ω is a symmetric evolutionary equi-
librium if s∗i = s
∗ for all i, and for all i, j and si: ui(si, s∗−i) ≤ uj(si, s∗−i). It is
strict if furthermore for all i, j and si 6= s∗: ui(si, s∗−i) < uj(si, s∗−i).
Alternatively, s∗ is the strategy of an evolutionary equilibrium if there is no i
and si such that ui(si, s∗−i) > uj(si, s
∗
−i) for j 6= i, and it is strict if furthermore
there is no i and si 6= s∗ such that ui(si, s∗−i) ≥ uj(si, s∗−i) for j 6= i. In terms
of the common payoﬀ function u, the requirement of Definition 1 is that for all s:
u(s, s∗, ..., s∗) ≤ u(s∗, s∗, ..., s∗, s).
As observed by Schaﬀer (1989), it is straightforward that symmetric evolutionary
equilibria can be characterized as symmetric Nash equilibria of a modified game with
payoﬀs defined relatively:
Proposition 1 Let uˆi(ω) ≡ ui(ω)−minj 6=i uj(ω). Then ω∗ = (s∗, ..., s∗) is a (strict)
symmetric evolutionary equilibrium in the game under consideration if and only if
ω∗ is a (strict) Nash equilibrium of the modified game where the set of players and
the strategy set are the same and the payoﬀ functions are (uˆi), i = 1, ..., n.
Proposition 1 is useful for finding or characterizing evolutionary equilibria as
in Sections 5 and 6, and it can be used for demonstrating existence of symmetric
evolutionary equilibrium for some games by standard fixed point arguments, e.g.:
Proposition 2 If S is compact and convex and payoﬀ functions are such that
ui(si, s−i)−minj 6=i uj(si, s−i)) is continuous in (si, s−i) and quasi concave in si for
all i, then a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium exists. If, furthermore, ui(si, s−i)−
minj 6=i uj(si, s−i) is strictly quasi concave, then all symmetric evolutionary equilibria
are strict.
For games with the aggregator property, Possajennikov (2003), Alós-Ferrer and
Ania (2002), and Schipper (2003) define a symmetric aggregate-taking equilibrium
as a symmetric profile where each player has maximized payoﬀ neglecting any in-
fluence on the aggregator A:
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Definition 2 A strategy profile (sa, ..., sa) is a symmetric aggregate-taking equilib-
rium if for all s ∈ S: v(sa, A(sa, ..., sa)) ≥ v(s,A(sa, ..., sa)). It is strict if further-
more for all s 6= sa: v(sa, A(sa, ..., sa)) > v(s,A(sa, ..., sa)).
Assuming diﬀerentiability, the first order condition for s∗ being a symmetric
aggregate-taking equilibrium is:
∂
∂s
[v(s, A(s∗))] ≡ v1 = 0.
Furthermore, according to Proposition 1, (s∗, ..., s∗) is an evolutionary equilibrium
if and only if s∗ maximizes ui(si, s∗−i)−minj 6=i uj(si, s∗−i) with respect to si for each
i. For games with the aggregator property this maximization problem is the same
as:
max
s∈S
£
v(s, A(s, s∗−i))− v(s∗, A(s, s∗−i)
¤
,
for which the first order condition is:
∂
∂s
£
v(s,A(s, s∗−i))− v(s∗, A(s, s∗−i))
¤
= v1 + v2
∂A
∂s
− v2
∂A
∂s
= v1 = 0.
The two first order conditions are thus equal. This proves:4
Proposition 3 If each of symmetric evolutionary equilibrium and symmetric aggregate-
taking equilibrium is unique and characterized by first order conditions then they
coincide.
3 The process of economic Darwinism
For our explicit dynamic analysis we have, for technical reasons, to assume that the
strategy set S is finite. We assume furthermore that the finite game considered is
such that equal payoﬀs for everybody can only be obtained if everybody uses the
same strategy, that is, in addition to Assumption 1 we assume:
Assumption 2. The strategy set S is finite and the common payoﬀ function u
is such that if u(si, s−i) takes the same value for for all i, then s1 = · · · = sn.
4The equivalence between evolutionary equilibria and aggregate-taking equilibria is investigated
more thoroughly by Possajennikov (2003) for the diﬀerentiable case and by Alós-Ferrer and Ania
(2002) for the general case. Proposition 3 is a version of Possajennikov’s result.
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Given finiteness, Assumption 2 is fulfilled generically: Consider a given finite
grid S. Assume that the payoﬀ function u were such that for some strategy profiles
with strategy diﬀerences all players got the same payoﬀ. Then almost any (small)
perturbation of u would imply payoﬀ diﬀerences for the same profiles. Hence, given
finiteness, Assumption 2 is little restrictive.
In a game with a large, but finite number of strategies in S, for instance a
price-setting oligopoly where prices have to be integers, appealing to the genericity
argument for “only equal payoﬀs at equal strategies” as we do, implies appealing
that very small payoﬀ diﬀerences can have evolutionary consequences. However, in
the present context an appropriate interpretation of a strategy is perhaps not “set
price equal to 55 cents”, but rather a general rule of thumb such as “set price equal
to the double of short run average cost” or “set price equal to the double of long run
marginal cost”. There may well be relatively few relevant such rules even though
there are truly many possible diﬀerent prices.
The n-player game considered is assumed to be played recurrently among indi-
viduals. The outcome in each round is described by a state that lists the actions
taken by each of the n individuals. Hence, a state has the structure of a strategy
profile and will be denoted by ω = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ Ω. The state space Ω is finite.
On this state space we define a dynamic process capturing the two essential
forces of economic selection and mutation.
According to economic selection individuals who perform badly in terms of pay-
oﬀ, the unfit, are sometimes displaced by other individuals who take up a random
action. We express economic selection dynamics by a basic (unperturbed) Markov
chain on Ω with a matrix Π0 of transition probabilities, π0ωω0 (0 ≤ π0ωω0 ≤ 1 for all
(ω, ω0), and
P
ω0 π
0
ωω0 = 1 for all ω), requiring:
(1) If ω = (s1, ..., sn) is such that all players obtain the same payoﬀ (ui(ω) = uj(ω)
for all i, j), then π0ωω = 1.
(2) If ω = (s1, ..., sn) is such that there are payoﬀ diﬀerences (ui(ω) 6= uj(ω)
for some i, j), then for any state ω0 = (s01, ..., s
0
n): (a) if π
0
ωω0 > 0, it must
be for all i ∈ argmaxj∈N uj(ω), that s0i = si, and (b) if s0i = si for all i /∈
argminj∈N uj(sj, s−j)), then π0ωω0 > 0.
The restrictions on Π0 expressing economic selection are that (1) if everybody
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gets the same payoﬀ in ω, then the next round’s state will also be ω for sure, and
(2) if there are payoﬀ diﬀerences at ω then (a) strategies yielding highest payoﬀ
are not changed, while (b) any successor where at least one of the players who got
minimal payoﬀ has shifted to another strategy, has positive probability, implying
that strategies with lowest payoﬀ disappear with positive probability and are taken
over by arbitrary other strategies.
We have expressed economic selection generally in terms of restrictions on the
transition probabilities, π0ωω0. Several explicit selection processes will imply our
general assumptions (1) and (2). Assume, for example, that in each round individ-
uals who receive a “selection draw” are replaced by individuals whose strategies are
picked according to a given probability distribution with full support on S. One
possible process is defined by everybody with lowest payoﬀ in the last round, and
no other, having a given, strictly positive (and independent) probability of receiving
a selection draw. Another possibility is that everybody who did not get the highest
payoﬀ in the last round, and no other, has a given (independent) probability of
receiving a selection draw. There are many possibilities in between, for instance
where the probability of receiving a selection draw depends negatively on payoﬀ in
“softer”, more monotone ways than in the two cases just described.
The mutation process is added as follows: From the state chosen in a given round
by the economic selection dynamic, Π0, there is for each player and for each s ∈ S
(independently) a small probability ε > 0 of switching to s within the round. Each
such switch is referred to as a mutation.5 This defines a modified Markov chain Πε,
where the transition probability from ω to ω00 is defined as follows: For a pair of
states ω0, ω00, let k(ω0, ω00) be the number of players behaving diﬀerently in the two
states, i.e., k(ω0, ω00) = # {i |s0i 6= s00i }. Thus, k(ω0, ω00) is the number of mutations
involved in the transition from ω to ω00 via ω0. Then, πεωω00 =
P
ω0:π0
ωω0>0
π0ωω0ε
k(ω0,ω00).
It is obvious that Πε is ergodic.6 Furthermore, Πε is a regular perturbation of
Π0 in the sense of Young (1993), i.e., Πε is ergodic, Πε → Π0 as ε→ 0, and for each
5The mutation process is that each individual mutates (independently) with probability ε ·#S,
and in case of mutation a random strategy is picked from S according to the uniform probability
distribution. It is well known that one can be much more general with respect to the muta-
tion process without aﬀecting results. For instance diﬀerent players could mutate with diﬀerent
probabilities and diﬀerent strategies could have diﬀerent probabilities when mutations occur.
6It is a finite Markov chain and irreducible (since from any state one can go to any other state
in one step by appropriate mutation), and aperiodic (since for any state one can stay in that state
by appropriate mutation).
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transition ωω00 for which π0ωω00 = 0, there is a well-defined order by which π
ε
ωω00 → 0
as ε→ 0. Here this order is given by the minimal number of mutations required to
go from ω to ω00, i.e., by minω0:π0(ω,ω0)>0 k (ω0, ω00). This number (which is equal to
zero when π0ωω00 > 0) is referred to as the resistance in the transition from ω to ω
00.
We state some standard results from the theory of Markov chains needed for
our purposes. The results mentioned can all be found in Young (1993) or Freidlin
and Wentzel (1984), see also Young (1998).
Since Πε is ergodic it has a unique invariant (stationary) distribution µε, i.e.,
a probability distribution over Ω fulfilling µεΠε = µε. In the long run the rela-
tive frequencies by which states are visited converge with probability one to the
probabilities of µε. Since our interest is in the process with economic selection
and mutation for small mutation probability, we will be interested in the limit dis-
tribution, µ0 = limε→0 µε. This limit distribution exists and is invariant for Π0
(µ0Π0 = µ0). Thus, the states that have strictly positive probability according to
µ0 are the only states that will be observed frequently when mutations are rare.
These states are termed stochastically stable states.
Definition 3 A state ω is stochastically stable with respect to the process of eco-
nomic Darwinism if and only if µ0(ω) > 0.
It follows from the existence of µ0 that stochastically stable states exist. The
remainder of this section presents a characterization of stochastically stable states.
An absorbing set is a subsetM of Ω, which is closed with respect to finite chains
of transitions with positive probability according to Π0, that is, for all ω ∈ M ,
ω0 /∈ M , one has π0ωω0 = 0, and for all ω, ω0 ∈ M , there are states ω1, ...ωm ∈ M ,
such that π0ωω1 > 0, π
0
ω1ω2 > 0, ..., π
0
ωmω0 > 0. In our case, the absorbing sets are
particularly simple, being exactly all the singleton sets of form {(s, s, ..., s)}, where
s is an arbitrary strategy in S:
Lemma 1 Given Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, for any s ∈ S, the set {(s, s, ..., s)}
is absorbing, and there are no other absorbing sets.
Proof. In a state ω = (s, s, ..., s) all players obtain the same payoﬀ by Assump-
tion 1. Hence π0ωω = 1, and {ω} is absorbing.
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Consider a state ω = (s1, ..., sn), where players do not all use the same strategy.
By Assumption 2, they do not all obtain the same payoﬀ. With positive probability
according to Π0, all the players with minimal payoﬀ switch to one of the strategies
in {si}i∈N that did not yield minimal payoﬀ, so in the resulting state fewer diﬀerent
strategies are used. If not all players use the same strategy in the resulting state,
then the argument can be repeated. It therefore has positive probability according
to Π0 that in a finite number of rounds a state of the form (s, s, ..., s) is reached,
and such a state is absorbing. Hence, no state with action diﬀerences can be in an
absorbing set and therefore no other absorbing sets than the singleton sets of form
{(s, s, ..., s)} exist. ¤
We will talk simply of absorbing states (not sets). An invariant distribution for
Π0 can only attach positive probability to absorbing states. Hence, only absorb-
ing states can be stochastically stable. This leaves us with many candidates, but
stochastically stable states can be further characterized.
Above we defined the resistance in a transition ω → ω00 from one state to
another as the integer number minω0:π0(ω,ω0)>0 k (ω0, ω00), i.e., as the minimal number
of mutations required to go from ω to ω00 in one step. Define the resistance in
a transition from one absorbing state, ω, to another, ω00, as the minimal total
resistance (minimal number of mutations) required to go from ω to ω00, possibly
indirectly over other states ω0 which do not have to be absorbing.
For any absorbing state ω, define an ω-tree as a directed graph on the set of
absorbing states, such that for any absorbing state ω0 6= ω there is exactly one path
in the graph leading from ω0 to ω. If there are k absorbing states, then any ω-tree
contains k − 1 arcs. For any given ω-tree define its total resistance as the sum of
all the resistances over the arcs in the tree. For any absorbing state ω define the
stochastic potential as the minimal total resistance over all ω-trees.
Young (1993) proves that the stochastically stable states are exactly the absorbing
states with minimal stochastic potential. We use this in the next section to establish
a very close relation between evolutionary equilibrium and stochastic stability with
respect to our process of economic Darwinism.
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4 Economic Darwinism implies evolutionary equi-
librium
In this section we (still) impose everywhere Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. This
means that any symmetric evolutionary equilibriummust be strict, since a deviating
player cannot obtain the same payoﬀ as the other players and must therefore obtain
strictly less. Given a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, (s∗, ..., s∗), we say that
the absorbing state ω∗ ≡ (s∗, ..., s∗) corresponds to the evolutionary equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Given Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, if a symmetric evolutionary
equilibrium exists, then any stochastically stable state with respect to the evolu-
tionary process of economic Darwinism corresponds to a symmetric evolutionary
equilibrium.
To prove this note that by assumption there is at least one symmetric evolu-
tionary equilibrium, so there is at least one state, ω∗ = (s∗, ..., s∗), corresponding to
an evolutionary equilibrium. The proof proceeds by showing, in two lemmas, that
the resistance in the transition from such an ω∗ to any other absorbing state is at
least two, while from any absorbing state, ω = (s, ..., s), that does not correspond
to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, the resistance in the transition from ω to
any state ω∗ that does correspond to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium is one.
Lemma 2 The resistance in a transition from an absorbing state, ω∗, corresponding
to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium to any other absorbing state, ω, is at least
two.
Proof. We show that it takes at least two mutations to go from an absorbing
state ω∗ = (s∗, ..., s∗) corresponding to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium to a
diﬀerent absorbing state. If there is only one mutation from ω∗, then the resulting
state has (at most) one player using a strategy s 6= s∗, while all the remaining
players still use s∗. By Assumption 1, all the players using s∗ get the same payoﬀ.
Furthermore, since (s∗, ..., s∗) is a strict symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, and
diﬀerent strategies are now used, it follows by Assumption 2 that the player who
plays s gets strictly less payoﬀ than the other players. So, according to Π0 it has
probability one that in the next state all the other players still play s∗, while the last
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player plays some s0, and it has positive probability that s0 = s∗. If s0 6= s∗, then
the same happens again with positive probability of reaching ω∗ in the next step.
As long as ω∗ has not yet been reached there is in each round positive probability of
reaching ω∗ in the next round. Let the minimal of these probabilities (over all states
where the last player has not yet come to play s∗) be πmin. Then over T rounds,
the probability of not reaching ω∗ is at most (1− πmin)T , which goes to zero as T
goes to infinity. It thus has probability one according to Π0 to eventually return to
ω∗. One cannot get from ω∗ to another absorbing state by just one mutation, so
the resistance from ω∗ to any other absorbing state ω is at least two. ¤
Lemma 3 The resistance in a transition from an absorbing state, ω, that does not
correspond to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, to any ω∗, that does corre-
sponding to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, is one.
Proof. We show that from an absorbing state ω = (s, ..., s) not corresponding to
a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, there is a single mutation leading to a state
from which it has positive probability according to Π0 to go to any ω∗ = (s∗, ..., s∗)
corresponding to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium. Since (s, ..., s) is not an
evolutionary equilibrium, there is a deviation, s0, that will bring the deviator a
strictly larger payoﬀ than the other players, who by Assumption 1 get the same
payoﬀ. Assume that player 1 mutates and plays s0. Now with positive probability
according to Π0, the process reaches in the next round a state (s0, s∗, ....s∗), where
player 1 still plays s0 while all other players play the strategy s∗. In this new state
the players 2, ..., n all get the same payoﬀ by Assumption 1 and player 1 obtains
strictly less, because (s∗, ..., s∗) is a strict evolutionary equilibrium. With positive
probability according to Π0 the process will therefore in the next round reach the
state (s∗, ....s∗). This means that the resistance from ω to any ω∗ is one. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider an ω-tree, where ω does not correspond to a
symmetric evolutionary equilibrium. Let ω∗ be a an absorbing state that does
correspond to a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium. Change the ω-tree in the
following way: remove the transition out of ω∗ (by Lemma 2 this has resistance
at least 2), and add a transition from ω to ω∗ (by Lemma 3 this has resistance
1). Thereby an ω∗-tree with strictly lower resistance than the ω-tree has been
constructed. This shows that the stochastic potential of ω∗ is strictly lower than
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the stochastic potential of ω, so that ω cannot be stochastically stable. Thus, any
stochastically stable state must correspond to an evolutionary equilibrium. ¤
Theorem 1 does not say that in games with more than one evolutionary equilib-
rium all states corresponding to evolutionary equilibria are stochastically stable,7
but for games with a unique evolutionary equilibrium we have:
Corollary 1 Given Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, if the game has a unique
evolutionary equilibrium (s∗, ...s∗), then the unique stochastically stable state is ω∗ =
(s∗, ...s∗).
If a game has exactly one symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, then only behav-
ior as in this equilibrium will be observed frequently according to the dynamics of
economic Darwinism.
Theorem 1 and its corollary are our basic results characterizing behavior re-
sulting from economic selection and mutation. A result similar to Corollary 1 for
processes of imitation and mutation is found in Schipper (2003), who extends the
analysis of Vega-Redondo (1997) to a class of games more general than Cournot
oligopoly, namely games which have the aggregator property, and where the payoﬀ
function v fulfils a particular assumption of “quasi-submodularity” with respect to
a player’s own strategy and the aggregate. Schipper shows that under these as-
sumptions, if the game has a unique aggregate-taking equilibrium, then there is
a unique stochastically stable state with respect to the process of imitation and
mutation and this state corresponds to the aggregate-taking equilibrium. Each of
these characterizing results, Schipper’s and our, essentially follows from three basic
features corresponding to our lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
First, absorbing sets are singletons where all individuals use the same strat-
egy. In our model this follows by Assumption 2, and this is the crucial role played
by Assumption 2. In Schipper’s and in Vega-Redondo’s settings it follows from a
particular feature of their imitation process: diﬀerent individuals who all obtain
maximal payoﬀ, but use diﬀerent strategies, imitate each other with positive proba-
bility. This is not an essential diﬀerence, however, since if one imposed Assumption
2 in an imitation setting one would be able to do without this particular assumption.
7Section 5.3 provides an example of a game with several evolutionary equilibria out of which
exactly one is stochastically stable.
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Second, it takes more than one mutation to escape an equilibrium. This follows
by more or less the same argument for the two types of processes, since a single
mutation from either an evolutionary or an aggregate-taking equilibrium will bring
the mutant less payoﬀ than the non-mutants and hence one is led back to the
equilibrium with positive probability either by economic selection or by imitation.
Third, it takes just one mutation to reach an equilibrium. In our setting of eco-
nomic selection, if play is stuck at an absorbing state that does not correspond to an
evolutionary equilibrium, then a mutation exists that gives the mutant strictly more
payoﬀ than the non-mutants. After such a mutation economic selection will with
positive probability bring all the non-mutants to play the strategy of a particular
symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, and in this new situation the mutant obtains
strictly less payoﬀ than the non-mutants, so economic selection will with positive
probability take play all the way to the equilibrium.8 In a setting of imitation
a similar argument would not work: it would still be true that from an absorb-
ing state not corresponding to an (aggregate-taking) equilibrium, there would be
a single mutation giving the mutant more payoﬀ than the non-mutants (since un-
der the considered assumptions an aggregate-taking equilibrium is an evolutionary
equilibrium), but the mutating strategy would not have to be an aggregate-taking
equilibrium strategy and therefore imitation of the successful mutation would not
necessarily take play all the way to an equilibrium. This is why sub-modularity is
assumed. For games with the aggregator property, sub-modularity ensures that if
all players use one and the same strategy that is not an aggregate-taking equilib-
rium strategy, then a deviation directly to the aggregate-taking equilibrium strategy
(assumed to be unique) will yield the deviator higher payoﬀ than the non-deviating
players. Hence, from any non-equilibrium absorbing state a single mutation to the
equilibrium strategy gives the mutant higher payoﬀ than the non-mutants and then
imitation will with positive probability bring all players to the equilibrium strategy.
Summing up, with respect to how the basic equivalence results are obtained, the
essential diﬀerence between the imitation based and the economic selection based
approaches, and the one intimately linked to the diﬀerence between imitation and
economic selection, is how the property that it takes just one mutation to reach an
8In the second step of this argument it is used that the evolutionary equilibrium in question
is strict, which is implied by Assumption 2. However, for this purpose one could have imposed a
direct assumption of strictness of equilibrium.
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equilibrium is ensured. As explained, for the process based on economic selection an
assumption like submodularity is not required, exactly because economic selection
allows for new strategies to emerge without mutation.
Our results thus apply also for games that are not submodular. This is an
important extension because some games of economic interest are not submodular,
e.g., the price-setting oligopoly with strategic complementarity considered in Section
5.2.
Furthermore, our results apply for symmetric games that do not have the ag-
gregator property. In Schipper’s contribution, as well as in Vega-Redondo’s, the in-
tention is to relate stochastic stability (with respect to the process of imitation and
mutation) to aggregate-taking equilibrium, for which purpose the aggregator prop-
erty is, of course, needed. Relating to evolutionary rather than to aggregate-taking
equilibrium allows us the generality of avoiding the assumption of the aggregator
property. Should this be fulfilled, evolutionary and aggregate-taking equilibrium
coincide under relevant assumptions, Possajennikov (2003), Alós-Ferrer and Ania
(2002) and Proposition 3 above.
5 Examples
The examples of this section illustrate the usefulness of the equivalences established
above, that is, Theorem 1 or Corollary 1 in combination with Proposition 1 or 3.
We consider a game with the aggregator property that is submodular (Section 5.1)
and a game with the aggregator property that is not submodular (Section 5.2), as
well as a game without the aggregator property (Section 5.3). The examples also
illustrate the economic consequences of economic Darwinism under externalities as
dealt with more generally in Section 6.
5.1 Cournot oligopoly
Each of n firms sets a quantity qi ∈ S = [0,∞) and obtains payoﬀ:
ui (q1, ..., qn) = P
Ã
nX
h=1
qh
!
qi − C (qi) ,
where the inverse demand curve, P (Q), and the cost curve, C(qi), are assumed to
be diﬀerentiable with P 0 < 0, C 0 > 0, and C 00 ≥ 0. This game has the aggregator
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property with
Pn
h=1 qh as the aggregator. We assume P (∞) < C 0(0) < P (0),
which means that there is a unique “competitive equilibrium”, qi = qc for all i and
P (nqc) = C 0(qc).
We do not have to conduct any formal analysis to find the outcome of economic
Darwinism in this example. A unique symmetric evolutionary equilibrium is equiv-
alent to symmetric Nash equilibrium in relative payoﬀs (Proposition 1) as well as to
symmetric aggregate-taking equilibrium (Proposition 3), and it is well-known that
each of these coincide with the unique competitive equilibrium under appropriate
conditions, Possajennikov (2003) and Vega-Redondo (1997). It follows that under
assumptions ensuring a unique symmetric evolutionary equilibrium this must be the
competitive equilibrium. For a version of the game where the strategy set is finite
and qc ∈ S and Assumption 2 is fulfilled, the state ωc = (qc, ..., qc) is by Theorem
1 the unique stochastically stable state.
The intuition for this result is instructive: Start from a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium given by qi = qne for all i, and ∂ui/∂qi = 0, or P 0(nqne)qne+P (nqne) = C 0(qne).
Price, P (nqne), is above marginal cost, C 0(qne). A unilateral increase of production
from qne by one oligopolist will (of course) imply a loss of profit for the deviator, but
the other oligopolists will loose more (strictly at qne the deviating player’s loss is of
second order while the others’ are of first order). All oligopolists’ payoﬀs are reduced
to the same extent by a decreased price, but as long as price is above marginal cost
the deviator is partly compensated by the positive marginal profit earned on the
increased production (given the price). Hence, all the way up to the competitive
equilibrium where price is equal to marginal cost, increases in production will im-
ply increased relative profit for the deviator, so only at the competitive equilibrium
no increase in relative profit can be obtained. For the particular game of Cournot
oligopoly the possibilities for relative payoﬀ increases are exhausted exactly when
price equals marginal cost.
In the Cournot example economic Darwinism leads to higher activity than does
Nash equilibrium (now assumed to be unique), qne < qc, as can easily be seen from
the conditions P (nqc) = C 0(qc) and P 0(nqne)qne + P (nqne) = C 0(qne). Nash equi-
librium in turn involves higher activity than in the social optimum (the monopoly
outcome), where qi = qo for all i, and qo maximizes P (nq) q − C (q): Assuming
P 00(Q)Q/P 0(Q) > −2, the function P (nq) q − C (q) is concave in q and there is
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a unique social optimum, 0 < qo < ∞, given by P 0(nqo)nqo + P (nqo) = C 0(qo).
Comparison to the first order condition for Nash equilibrium shows that qo < qne.
All in all qo < qne < qc, and the example suggest that this will be a general property
of situations with negative externalities, and vice versa for positive externalities.
Our next example demonstrates primarily the usefulness of our established
equivalences and the bite of economic Darwinism in games that are not submodular.
It also shows that competitive equilibrium, or price equal to marginal cost, is not a
general implication of economic Darwinism.
5.2 A diﬀerentiated product Bertrand oligopoly with strate-
gic complementarity
Consider a market with n price-setting firms and zero maginal costs, where the
payoﬀ functions are:
ui (pi, p−i) =
µ
1− pi +
1
2
Pn
h=1 ph
n
¶
pi.
This game has the aggregator property with the average price, A = (
Pn
h=1 ph) /n,
as the aggregator.
The symmetric unique Nash equilibrium of this game is pi = pne for all i, where:
pne =
2n
3n− 1 .
Taking the aggregate as given, best responses are:
pi =
1
2
µ
1 +
1
2
A
¶
.
Thus, the optimal pi is increasing in A, i.e., there is strategic complementary be-
tween the aggregate A and the individual price pi, which implies that quasi sub-
modularity is not fulfilled.
The unique symmetric aggregate-taking equilibrium is pi = p∗ = 2/3 for all i,
and by Proposition 3 this is also the unique symmetric evolutionary equilibrium.
In an appropriate finite version of the game where 2/3 ∈ S, Theorem 1 implies that
the unique stochastically stable state is ω∗ = (p∗, ..., p∗).
The symmetric price that maximizes the firms’ common payoﬀ, ui (p, ..., p) =¡
1− p+ 1
2
p
¢
p, is po = 1. Hence p∗ < pne < po.
18
In our examples so far the outcome of economic Darwinism has corresponded
to “optimization neglecting one’s influence on the aggregator”. We now consider
a game where this is not the case, because the game does not have the aggregator
property.
5.3 A learning spill-over game
Each of n ≥ 4 firms produces output from labor input ci ∈ [0,∞). The wage rate
is normalized to one. The firms sell output at a common price p > 0. A productive
externality, a learning spillover, implies that a firm’s production depends positively
on the labor input of the firm among the other firms that uses the largest labor
input and hence has the highest production (each firm learns from the one opponent
there is most to learn from). The payoﬀ functions are:
ui(c1, ..., cn) = 4c
1
2
i
∙
max
j 6=i
cj
¸ 1
4
p− ci.
This game does not have the aggregator property.
The best reply of firm i, given by
∂ui
∂ci
= 2c
− 1
2
i
∙
max
j 6=i
cj
¸ 1
4
p− 1 = 0,
is ci = [maxj 6=i cj]
1
2 (2p)2. Hence, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is ci =
cne ≡ (2p)4 for all i.
The Nash equilibrium is not eﬃcient. The best symmetric outcome is found by
maximizing 4c
3
4p− c with respect to c. The first order condition is 3c−14p− 1 = 0,
giving the symmetric social optimum, ci ≡ co = (3p)4 for all i. In Nash equilibrium
too little eﬀort is exerted from a social point of view, because each firm does not
take the positive externality of its production into account.9
To find the symmetric evolutionary equilibria by use of Proposition 1, we find
the following right and left hand derivatives at symmetric points (ch = c for all h):µ
∂ui
∂ci
− ∂uj
∂ci
¶
∂ci>0
¯¯¯¯
¯
ch=c
= 2c
− 1
2
i
∙
max
j 6=i
cj
¸ 1
4
p− 1− c
1
2
j c
− 3
4
i p = c
−1
4p− 1,
9The eﬃcient symmetric outcome is not overall eﬃcient: a higher total payoﬀ can be obtained
in asymmetric situations where only one or two firms exert a lot of eﬀort.
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µ
∂ui
∂ci
− ∂uj
∂ci
¶
∂ci<0
¯¯¯¯
¯
ch=c
= 2c
− 1
2
i
∙
max
j 6=i
cj
¸ 1
4
p− 1 = 2c−14p− 1.
By Proposition 1, the conditions:µ
∂ui
∂ci
− ∂uj
∂ci
¶
∂ci>0
¯¯¯¯
¯
ch=c
≤ 0, and
µ
∂ui
∂ci
− ∂uj
∂ci
¶
∂ci<0
¯¯¯¯
¯
ch=c
≥ 0,
characterize interior evolutionary equilibrium. These conditions are equivalent to
p4 ≤ c ≤ (2p)4. Thus, there is a continuum of symmetric evolutionary equilibria,
ci = c for all i, namely one for each c from p4 up to the Nash equilibrium (2p)
4.
In an appropriate finite version of the game, where (2p)4 ∈ S and Assumption
2 is fulfilled, the unique stochastically stable state is ω∗ = ((2p)4 , ..., (2p)4) corre-
sponding to the evolutionary equilibrium that is also Nash equilibrium. To see this
first note that by Theorem 1, only states corresponding to evolutionary equilibria
can be stochastically stable. Consider any state (c, ..., c) where c is an evolutionary
equilibrium and c 6= (2p)4. From this state simultaneous mutation by two play-
ers to (2p)4 will result in a state ω0 where the mutants get the Nash-equilibrium
payoﬀ (since they can utilize the learning spill-over from each other), whereas the
non-mutants get a strictly lower payoﬀ (facing the same learning spill-over as the
mutants, but exerting too little eﬀort). Thus there will be positive probability ac-
cording to the unperturbed process to go from ω0 to ω∗. From ω∗, on the other
hand, two mutations do not suﬃce to escape, since any two mutants will obtain
strictly lower payoﬀ than the remaining (at least two) players who still use (2p)4:
two mutants who both mutate to c < (2p)4, will (as the non-mutants) utilize the
spill-over from (2p)4, but their eﬀort levels will be inferior.
This example illustrates the bite of economic Darwinism in situations where the
aggregator property is not fulfilled and in situations where evolutionary equilibrium
does not give a sharp prediction.
6 Economic implications of economic Darwinism
The examples of Section 5 suggest that externalities imply that economic Darwinism
generally leads to socially too high or low activity to a degree at least as bad as,
and sometimes worse than, Nash equilibrium. This is indeed a general result as will
now be shown.
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We impose some simplifying assumptions in addition to Assumption 1. First we
assume that the strategy set, S, is a convex and closed subset of R+, and that the
payoﬀ functions, ui, are diﬀerentiable (until we “finitize” the game to be able to
use the relation between evolutionary equilibrium and stochastically stable states).
Second, we consider situations where externalities are overall positive, ∂ui/∂sh >
0 for all i 6= h. Results for the case of overall negative externalities, ∂ui/∂sh < 0
for all i 6= h, follow analogously.
Third, we assume that each of the concepts symmetric social optimum, symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium and symmetric evolutionary equilibrium is unique and that the
latter two are interior and fully characterized by first order conditions (considered
below) and furthermore, these properties are insensitive to small perturbations of
payoﬀ functions (the latter property being fulfilled generically).
Welfare, W (s), at a common strategy, s, is the common utility of all players at
the strategy profile (s, ..., s), that is, W (s) ≡ ui(s, ..., s) for any i. The symmetric
social optimum is: si = so for all i, where so maximizes W (s).
Our final assumption is that W is concave. The derivative of W (s) is:
W 0(s) =
nX
h=1
∂ui
∂sh
(s, ..., s) ,
where, from the assumed symmetry, i can again be any player.
Define the “marginal product”, m(s) ≡ ∂ui∂si (s, ..., s), from a symmetric profile.
Again, i can be any player in this definition. The unique symmetric Nash equilib-
rium, si = sne for all i, is given by m(sne) = 0. From our assumptions, m(s) has
to be strictly decreasing at sne: First, m(s) has to intersect strictly with the s-axis
at s = sne, since otherwise a small perturbation of payoﬀ functions could imply
non-existence of Nash equilibrium. Second, m(s) must be decreasing by the second
order condition.
Since, at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, m(sne) = ∂ui∂si (s
ne, ..., sne) = 0, one
has:
W 0(sne) =
X
h6=i
∂ui
∂sh
(sne, ..., sne) ,
which is strictly positive because of positive externalities. Hence, so > sne, and
obviouslyW (sne) < W (so). This is just a restatement of the well-known result that
with positive externalities, Nash equilibrium implies socially too little activity.
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A symmetric evolutionary equilibrium, si = s∗ for all i, is given by the first
order condition: ∂ui∂si (s
∗, ..., s∗) − ∂uj∂si (s
∗, ..., s∗) = 0, where the first term is m (s∗),
and, again because of symmetry, i and j can be any two (diﬀerent) players. Hence,
m(s∗) =
∂uj
∂si
(s∗, ..., s∗) .
Positive externalities thus imply m(s∗) > 0. Since m(sne) = 0, and m(s) is de-
creasing at s = sne and m(s) only has the one intersection with the axis at sne, one
has that s∗ < sne. Hence, the evolutionary equilibrium is further away from the
social optimum than the Nash equilibrium implying, from the concavity of W , that
W (s∗) < W (sne).
Imposing an appropriate further assumption of finiteness where all of so, sne
and s∗ are in S, and Assumption 2, symmetric social optimum, symmetric Nash
equilibrium, and symmetric evolutionary equilibrium are unchanged and the latter
coincide with the unique stochastically stable state. This suﬃces for:
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions of this section, if externalities are overall pos-
itive (negative), symmetric social optimum implies “higher” (“lower”) actions and
higher welfare than does symmetric Nash equilibrium, and symmetric Nash equilib-
rium implies “higher” (“lower”) actions and higher welfare than does the outcome
of economic Darwinism.
7 Concluding remarks
Our first main results, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, establish a close connection
between frequently observed, so-called stochastically stable states and evolutionary
equilibrium, in fact an equivalence when the latter exists uniquely. One implication
is that economic Darwinism does not in general support Nash equilibrium behavior.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 hold under relatively general conditions. By consid-
ering an evolutionary process based on economic selection rather than on imitation
we have obtained a process that in our eyes captures ’survival of the fittest in eco-
nomics contexts’ more reasonably and at the same time gives more generality in
the basic characterization results: we have avoided underlying assumptions of the
aggregator property and sub-modularity.
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Our second main result, Theorem 2, establishes what we consider to be the most
important economic implication of economic Darwinism: in the presence of overall
positive or negative externalities, outcomes arising from economic Darwinism are
even worse than Nash equilibrium outcomes.
It is not just, as with Nash equilibrium, that each individual’s behavior is in-
sensitive to the way it aﬀects other people’s payoﬀs. For the outcomes of economic
Darwinism it is true that even if an increase in “eﬀort” would benefit the indi-
vidual undertaking it, the increase will not be undertaken unless it improves the
individual’s relative position, that is, unless it benefits the individual more than it
benefits other individuals. And even if it hurts the individual, it will be undertaken
if it hurts other people more. This gives an increased tendency (as compared to
Nash equilibrium behavior) to contributing too little in the presence of positive
spill-overs, and to exploiting too much in the presence of negative spill-overs.
It is often argued that social institutions such as legal systems or customary
norms and conventions are rooted in the fact that traditional selfish (Nash equi-
librium) behavior would create socially too bad outcomes in standard social envi-
ronments. In so far as unchecked behavior is more guided by evolutionary forces
than by selfish “rationality”, the argument in favor of social institutions stands even
stronger.
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